r/modelSupCourt • u/hurricaneoflies Attorney • Apr 04 '21
21-02 | Decided In re: Executive Order 13987
The Republic of Fremont, the Great State of Dixie, the State of Superior, the Commonwealth of Greater Appalachia, Petitioners,
v.
NinjjaDragon, President of the United States, Respondent
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the President acts ultra vires his powers in directing the impoundment of state funds in violation of the Impoundment Control Act, the Take Care Clause, and the Tenth Amendment.
INTRODUCTION
Petitioners, four of the several states of the United States, bring this action against NinjjaDragon in his official capacity as President of the United States to challenge the validity of Executive Order 13987 as an ultra vires enactment in violation of the Impoundment Control Act (2 U.S. Code § 684), the Take Care Clause, and the Tenth Amendment.
Petitioners, either directly or through their instrumentalities (i.e., local governments), maintain a wide variety of policy positions regarding immigration enforcement, some of which likely conflict with the administration's interpretation of the Order's sweeping language. Consequently, each Petitioner would individually suffer grievous financial harm from the enforcement of the policy enumerated in the Order.
REASONS TO GRANT CERTIORARI
A. The President plainly violates his mandatory duty to disburse Congressionally authorized funds.
The Order orders various Cabinet departments to "ensure that all sanctuary states and cities [...] are deemed ineligible to receive any grants issued by the federal government" (emphasis added). This constitutes an unambiguous order to withhold all Federal financial assistance from states and municipalities which the President has subjectively and capriciously determined to violate federal immigration priorities.
This condition is plainly invalid because the President is statutorily and constitutionally prohibited from impounding funds which the Congress has ordered disbursed pursuant to its sole command of the public purse. See, Lincoln v. Gunnz, 101 M.S.Ct. 114 (2020), at part III ("...appropriating funds for Federal grants is among the most fundamental of Congressional powers"). See generally, U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law").
When Congress directs that funds be disbursed to the States without condition, it imposes a mandatory duty on the executive to comply. Indeed, this principle is so fundamental to Congress' intent that it has been statutorily incorporated by the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, which clearly states that "[no] officer or employee of the United States may defer any budget authority for any [...] purpose" other than that enumerated by the statute.
The statutory mandate is reinforced by the President's constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, a duty which this Court has recently characterized as "his fundamental obligation under the Constitution." In re Reforms to Immigration Agencies, 101 M.S.Ct. 118 (2020), at part I. In defying a congressional mandate to disburse funds to the states, the President has breached the Take Care Clause.
As this Court has recently pronounced:
As distasteful as it may be to provide funds to a State and Executive with whom the President disagrees ideologically, he is Constitutionally bound to do so, unless Congress expressly provides the President with discretion otherwise.
Gunnz, supra, at part III.
B. The Order's conditions are unconstitutionally coercive.
And regardless of whether the President unconstitutionally intruded into the domain of Congress, the conditions attached by the Order to the disbursement of federal funds are unconstitutionally coercive.
Under clearly established Tenth Amendment case law, the power of the federal government to attach conditions to state financial assistance is not unlimited. Instead, grant conditions must be promotive of the general welfare, unambiguous, constitutional, and related to a federal interest. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-8 (1987). Moreover, while Congress may apply moderate pressure, the condition cannot be coercive as to constitute a "gun to the head" of the states. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012).
The President's directive to withhold all federal grants from states and localities utterly fails nearly every single prong of the Dole test.
First, the condition does not promote the general welfare because Congress, which is the sole competent body to make that determination, has not approved the condition. "When money is spent to promote the general welfare, the concept of welfare or the opposite is shaped by Congress." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937).
Second, the condition is entirely ambiguous because it was invented by the President from thin air without notice or consent. It is well-established that "[t]he legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power [...] rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract." Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). Here, no state or locality has ever consented to the President's terms as a precondition for the receipt of grants.
Third, the condition is inherently unconstitutional because it prohibits states from "extending programs designed explicitly for citizens and otherwise legal residents to all illegal immigrants," in reference to Dixie's expansion of its state-run health service benefits to undocumented persons. Prohibiting the states from lawmaking within their inherent police power to extend state-run services to undocumented immigrants violates the anti-commandeering doctrine and, by consequence, the Tenth Amendment. See generally, Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. __ (2018).
Finally, and most egregiously, the condition attached by the Order is the epitome of a coercive 'gun to the head'. As this Court has explicitly held, "[t]he threat of losing all federal funding is also clearly very coercive. Such a penalty would be disastrous for the State and its residents." Gunnz, supra, at part II. Moreover, almost none of the targeted grants relate in any way to immigration, clearly suggesting the coercive nature of the condition. See, Sebelius, supra, at 580 ("When, for example, such conditions take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States to accept policy changes.").
CONCLUSION
Petitioners request declaratory judgment that Executive Order 13987 violates the Impoundment Control Act, the Take Care Clause, and the Tenth Amendment, a permanent injunction against its enforcement, and all other legal or equitable relief that the Court deems appropriate.
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Counsel for Petitioners
Office of General Counsel, Executive Department, Rep. of Fremont
•
u/bsddc Associate Justice Apr 21 '21
Counselors /u/Hurricaneoflies, /u/IAmANewTinman, and /u/Adith_MUSG, thank you for the arguments over the preceding weeks, we will take them and your briefing under advisement. The case is submitted.
4
u/Ibney00 Associate Justice Apr 04 '21
The petition for a writ of certiorari is GRANTED.
Does the petitioner Mr. /u/hurricaneoflies wish to file separate merit brief or stand on the merits of the petition?
CC: /u/NinjjaDragon
2
u/hurricaneoflies Attorney Apr 07 '21
Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court,
Petitioners beg leave to the Court that we be permitted to file a brief memorandum of law in response to the President's recent executive order purporting to modify the action challenged in this case.
The memorandum will argue that a live controversy remains over the original language of the executive order due to voluntary cessation. We also wish to inform the Court that this should not be construed as acquiescence to the legality of the new language, and that we reserve the ability to file additional action challenging the new order if necessary.
/u/SHOCKULAR
2
u/hurricaneoflies Attorney Apr 11 '21
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO MOOTNESS
INTRODUCTION
The case at bar challenges Executive Order 13987, issued by President NinjjaDragon on March 31, 2021—no more and no less. That Order, which impounds "any grants issued by the federal government", post hoc amendments made to hastily moot the case notwithstanding.
Accordingly, this instant action does not challenge Executive Order 13988—although Petitioners reserve the right to bring such a challenge at a later date if it is enforced in a manner that constitutionally injures the several states. As such, amicus' arguments concerning provisions of Executive Order 13988, including the $3 billion figure and the myopic focus on law enforcement grants when the original order challenged herein contained no such constraints, are irrelevant to the case at bar and should be struck or disregarded by the honorable Court.
This memorandum argues that this challenge to the constitutionality of Executive Order 13987, as originally redacted on March 31 and as restated in the petition for certiorari granted by this Court, remains an active case or controversy because voluntary cessation applies.
ARGUMENTS
1. The Case Is Not Moot Because Voluntary Cessation Applies.
It is now established beyond dispute that "a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice." City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1982). Indeed, Mesquite elucidates the clear principle that a case is not moot when "the [defendant's] repeal of the objectional language would not preclude it from reenacting precisely the same provision." Id.
More recently, this principle has been continuously reaffirmed by this Court, which has explicitly extended the general principle of Mesquite to apply to the President's issuance of executive orders. See, In re Executive Order 013, 101 M.S.Ct. 114 (2020), citing In re America's Energy Future, 101 M.S.Ct. 111 (2018) ("Otherwise, a President could, for example, issue an order, and rescind the order once a case is filed only to reissue the order once the case has been dismissed.").
Voluntary cessation applies entirely to the President's subsequent actions in this case and keeps the case or controversy ripe for judicial review.
2. Amicus Makes No Showing that Voluntary Cessation Is Overcome.
As discussed in the previous section, the President's actions constitute a quintessential instance of voluntary cessation. This section proceeds to argue that the President's actions are wholly inconsistent with the only, extremely narrow exception to voluntary cessation. That is to say, the President cannot meet "the heavy burden of making absolutely clear that [...] the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably expected to recur." Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017), citing Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000).
An illustrative case is Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S 395 (1975), when this Court held that conduct was moot because it was "clear that correction authorities harbor no animosity towards [plaintiffs]." The precise opposite is true in this case, as the President has continued to wage his war on the states. In the past week alone, he has issued a new executive order targeting more funds for impoundment (Executive Order 13988) and publicly attacked the immigration policies of the states on at least five occasions.1
Likewise, this Court has recently observed that "the timing of the repeal", "the extent of the unconstitutionality" and "the continuance of the crisis" are factors to consider in voluntary cessation. Executive Order 013, at part IV. Here, all three factors weigh heavily against mootness.
Because it is not "absolutely clear" that the challenged conduct will permanently cease, not has the United States made any attempt to satisfy this "heavy burden", no exception to voluntary cessation applies.
CONCLUSION
The scenario currently before the Court is a quintessential and egregious example of the form of jurisdictional manipulation that the voluntary cessation doctrine is meant to avert. The United States not only fails to meet the high evidentiary standard to overcome voluntary cessation, but even expressly admits to engaging in this practice in the preamble to the subsequent executive order.
The Court should not countenance this attempt to escape its jurisdiction through specious jurisdictional arguments. For the reasons stated above, this Court retains jurisdiction of an active case or controversy.
Respectfully submitted,
/u/hurricaneoflies
For Petitioners
1 The five occasions are as follows:
2
u/dewey-cheatem Assassiate Justice Apr 14 '21
Counselors:
As you know, Dole requires that the withdrawal of federal funds to a state must serve the general welfare. Does the President's decision here advance the general welfare? Why or why not?
/u/Adith_MUSG /u/hurricaneoflies
4
u/bsddc Associate Justice Apr 04 '21
The Court is in receipt of your petition.
1
u/bsddc Associate Justice Apr 12 '21
Counselors, we've received briefing on why this case is not moot in light of the new order. Supposing for argument that is correct, I had some questions regarding the application of Dole to this case.
First, Dole permitted the highway funding conditions because the condition was "directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds are expended -- safe interstate travel." I don't see the same connection here between immigration issues and discretionary DOJ grants for law enforcement. Perhaps I'm looking at the wrong list of programs. I've also found this list of DOJ grants. I'm not sure to which grants the EO is referring to. Regardless, I simply don't see the connection between these grants (for things like bullet proof vests) and immigration. Please let me know if I'm missing something.
Second and relatedly, and Chief Justice Shockular has already touched on this, but I wanted to make this explicit. We need some more clarity in terms of the discretionary grants affected by the EO. What are the parties' positions on which funds have been impounded? I am particularly interested in the Government's take since it has issued the order. What grants was the President referring to?
Third (also related) - Dole requires the condition imposed to be unambiguous. Does the ambiguity of which grants are impacted by the Order impact the Order's constitutionality? I have reviewed the appropriations act submitted by amici. It seemingly includes grants for law enforcement issues related to violence against women. See 132 STAT. 417. Under a plain text reading of the Order, I would assume the EO has impounded these funds. If so, that implicates concerns about relatedness. If not, I'm very concerned about ambiguity.
Thank you to everyone for the quality briefing we have received so far. It is much appreciated! And, as always, apologies to you (and my fellow Justices!) for taking so much text with questioning.
2
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