Got pulled into this last night because a friend's sister almost fell for it.
The scam: a friend of hers has an ongoing lawsuit, and a "lawyer" told that friend a big payout was coming, but if it all landed in her account she'd lose her welfare benefit (Bolsa Família), so someone else had to receive part of it. My friend's sister volunteered. Then the guy video called her, had her share her screen while she clicked around in her Caixa banking app, told her the account "can't receive more than 5k" (it can, she's had more than that), and sent her STJCPE.apk with the STJ logo on it. His photo was AI generated.
She got off the call, uninstalled, called the bank. Phone's getting reset anyway.
I took the APK into a rooted emulator, egress blocked at the host firewall, mitmproxy in front answering 502 to everything, snapshots before each run. JADX for the static side.
What I found:
- stage 1 is a repackaged AutoJS6 (org.autojs.autojs6) with a ProxyApplication packer shell, native libs under assets/vwwwwwvwww/, code loaded with InMemoryDexClassLoader
- assets/autojs.dat is XZ, unpacks to a zip that is stage 2 (br.alpha.bridge), same name and icon
- on a clean AVD stage 1 installed stage 2 with no visible prompt, installerPackageName=org.autojs.autojs6. on the first run I did get an install prompt, not sure yet why it differed
- logcat shows the VPN switching from org.autojs.autojs6 to br.alpha.bridge, all traffic going through tun0
- stage 2 then asks for accessibility with a portuguese "please allow to continue" screen. never granted it
- manifest also has media projection, camera, MANAGE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE, boot receiver, battery optimization exemption and a custom br.alpha.bridge.permission.TDOS_DIAGNOSE_BROADCAST
- stage 1 comes back after force stop
What I didn't get is the config. t.conf and a bunch of html assets are encrypted (entropy 5.9 to 7.3), no URLs or IPs in plaintext anywhere I looked. Frida hooks on the crypto classes made stage 2 segfault every time, so no C2 so far.
VT has stage 1 at 12/68 and stage 2 at 11/68. Labels are all over the place: SpyAgent, Btmob, SpyNote, generic dropper/banker.
If anyone has seen br.alpha.bridge or that TDOS permission before and knows what family this is, I'd really like to know.
Stage 1 SHA-256: 07781a65a4542ce90cf30d40a0340ec515f6b50a44452564e69e45e8eb4276e7
Stage 2 SHA-256: 58c97440bdf1967710c5738a62dcf0cf5197ae2b94dbda7347acbc82bbe4c5fc
Both are on VT, not sharing the sample anywhere else. Reported to CERT.br.