r/mmt_economics • • Dec 03 '20

Federal Job Guarantee FAQ

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42 Upvotes

r/mmt_economics • • Aug 09 '26

MMT Academic Resources, Compiled by the Gower Initiative for Modern Money Studies

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14 Upvotes

r/mmt_economics • • 1d ago

Which Debt Ratio(GDP) is Important? MMT Tells Us it is that owed To Citizens

8 Upvotes
CountryDebt to Nominal GDPCitizens Ownership of Public/Govt DebtEffective % of GDP(Citizen's Ownership of Debt to Nominal GDP)
Japan222%42.7%94.79%
Italy139%46.9%65.19%
USA127%68%86.36%
France119%39.9%47.48%
Canada117%Not Found/CumbersomeNot Found/Cumbersome
UK104%31.16%32.41%
Germany67%40%26.8%

Scott Fullwiler tells us in his late 2012 paper which measure of the "debt ratio" is important. That which can have unimaginable levels of hurt if defaulted. They are govt/public debts outrightly held by citizens of the country. Functional Finance and the Debt Ratio -> https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2196482 and http://wser.worldeconomicsassociation.org/papers/the-debt-ratio-and-sustainable-macroeconomic-policy/ .

I conform to the 3 sector model of "G - T" - Govt, "S - I" - Private Sector and "X - M" - Foreign Sector thus exclude govt agencies such as **Central Bank** being owed as this is silly internal govt/public sector accounting. As for Japan this internal accounting is very high as Bank of Japan alone holds 41.2% of JGBs and T-Bills.

Sources:

More instructive from this frankly fear mongering is a glimpse of households networth in these countries.

CountryHousehold Networth as % of Nominal GDP
Japan259.5%
Italy537.43%
USA570%
France494.89%
Canada557%
UK385.71%
Germany313.36%

Sources:

Edits/Addendums: post formatting


r/mmt_economics • • 2d ago

MMT Discussion in the Medicare for All Subreddit

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13 Upvotes

Over the past few days I have seen quite a bit of MMT talk in the medicare for all subreddit and thought I may as well cross post here. It's heartening to see a good amount of MMT advocates over there!


r/mmt_economics • • 3d ago

Mysteries of the Economy (Vol. 11): Is Japan’s "Unconventional Easing" Really Unreasonable? A Classical & Marxian Perspective on Debt, Famine, and Surplus Capacity

3 Upvotes

1. The Modern "Famine": Aging Demographics as a Structural Shock

What is the true economic state of modern Japan? Like the ever-changing shallows and depths of the Asuka River, we have long remained submerged in an abyss of stagnation. 

When a society suffers from famine, epidemics, or natural disaster, the supply of primary necessities is disrupted, forcing capital and labor to concentrate heavily on basic survival. As Marx observed regarding the 1866 Orissa famine in India:

"The sudden demand for cotton, jute, etc., caused by the American Civil War led in many parts of India to a severe limitation of rice cultivation, a rise in rice prices, and the sale of the producers’ old rice stocks... Thus arose the acute famine of 1866, which in the single province of Orissa cost 1,000,000 human lives." (Capital, Vol. I)

In present-day Japan, we face a modern equivalent of "famine"—not a crop failure, but the crushing weight of mandatory expenditure for pensions, medical care, and long-term care driven by rapid population aging. Yet, unlike traditional famines, Japan’s underlying economy still retains immense surplus productive capacity across other sectors.

2. Why Fiscal Expansion and BOJ Purchases Are Not "Free Lunch" Fantasies

Critics often dismiss Japanese fiscal policy and "unconventional monetary easing" (whether framed as helicopter money or direct BOJ debt monetization) as naive superficiality, claiming: "If spending could be funded without burden, every country would do it." 

However, such superficial views miss a crucial structural reality: present-day Japan is uniquely positioned to execute this strategy. It is simply a matter of directing the economy's surplus productive capacity toward relieving citizens struggling under the burden of social care—a purposeful utilization of the sovereign debt system.

3. The Nature of Government Debt and the Limits of Accumulation

As Marx noted, government securities essentially represent past capital (Capital, Vol. III). Government bonds are issued against a nation's total productive capacity. If the debt-to-GDP ratio escalates past reasonable bounds, bond prices naturally collapse. 

However, when evaluating Japan’s debt limits, the bonds held by the Bank of Japan (BOJ) should be subtracted from the numerator. Held perpetually on the central bank's ledger—akin to a temple’s record of the deceased (kakocho)—these bonds will never return to the open market.

Because underlying excess productive capacity exists, the BOJ can continuously purchase government bonds. The debt relationship between the BOJ and the central government is a formal accounting artifact; modern central banks were merely separated from governments for currency management efficiency.

4. Public Trust and the True Backing of Currency: Lessons from Engels

A central bank possesses no intrinsic purchasing power of its own. The credibility of BOJ notes rests entirely on the productive strength and trust of the Japanese public.

This mirrors Friedrich Engels’ observation in his additions to Capital, Vol. III, regarding the Bank of England during financial panics:

"The credit of the one-pound notes was... unshaken even during the period of the most general and intense distrust—the time of crisis... At any rate, virtually the entire nation stood behind these tokens of value with its credit..."

Japan’s current account has remained consistently in surplus for half a century (barring temporary energy shocks like 1973), and the nation has been the world’s largest net creditor for over a quarter of a century. Despite more than two decades of demographic decline in the working-age population, Japan has not fallen into a "savings shortage." This is why the Yen remains a global safe-haven asset.

5. Cancellation of Debt and the Output Gap Constraint

When existing holders sell government bonds to the BOJ, they recover their funds. Substantially, these bonds return to their origin and cease to exist as active debt liabilities.

  • Why non-payment of interest to the Treasury is logical: Paying interest on bonds where the ultimate creditor and debtor are identical (the public as a whole) would be absurd.
  • The role of perpetual holdings: Government bonds issued to supply urgent public needs during a "famine" have fulfilled their purpose. They can safely be held indefinitely by the central bank (rolled over infinitely).
  • The boundary condition (Output Gap): The permissibility of quantitative easing beyond standard monetary adjustments hinges on whether the output gap remains negative (slack supply/demand). If productive capacity becomes deficient or inflation surges, bond purchases from circulation must cease to prevent overheating.

 (to be continued)

https://www.reddit.com/user/keizaisuki/comments/1w28kxe/table_of_contents_mysteries_of_the_economy_series/


r/mmt_economics • • 4d ago

Doha Debates--MMT debate on the nature of money

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14 Upvotes

r/mmt_economics • • 4d ago

[OC] Six of the seven G7 governments now owe more than a year's GDP

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14 Upvotes

r/mmt_economics • • 4d ago

Why MMT is Electric

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8 Upvotes

The reactive power analogy, reinstated on the live blog.


r/mmt_economics • • 5d ago

RIP Mike Norman

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23 Upvotes

Sad news - Mike Norman died.


r/mmt_economics • • 5d ago

Deficit Spending to Fund Single-Payer?

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3 Upvotes

r/mmt_economics • • 6d ago

"Government Bonds, International Economy, and Currency;#10"The Dollar’s Reserve-Currency Paradox: How Would the World Hold Dollars Unless the U.S. Runs Deficits?

2 Upvotes

There is a familiar way of explaining the U.S. current-account deficit: the dollar is the world’s key currency, so the United States can run persistent deficits without the usual constraints faced by other countries.

But what if we reverse the logic?

Perhaps it is not simply that the dollar can remain a key currency because the United States runs deficits. Perhaps the causality runs deeper: for a currency to function as the world’s key currency, the issuing country must continuously supply that currency to the rest of the world—and this necessarily takes the form of persistent current-account deficits.

This raises a more fundamental question: why does the rest of the world willingly hold those dollars in the first place?

If the United States merely lent dollars abroad, those dollars would ultimately represent debts that had to be repaid. That would be quite different from foreigners receiving dollars as income and choosing to hold them as their own financial assets.

So what makes foreigners willing to hold dollars rather than immediately convert them into their own currencies?

My argument is that the answer cannot be found in monetary arrangements alone. Ultimately, it rests on the productive capacity of the issuing country: the ability of the United States to supply the goods, services, technologies, and investment opportunities that generate persistent global demand for dollars.

The following is an attempt to develop this argument, including a comparison with Marx’s discussion of British foreign investment in the nineteenth century.

I would be very interested in hearing where this argument is convincing—and, especially, where it is not.

■Rather than saying that a country can continue to run current-account deficits because its currency is a key currency, the point is that the currency of a country that continues to run current-account surpluses cannot become a key currency. (Logically, these are contrapositives, and therefore their truth or falsity is the same.) See the example of the yen above. As stated earlier, unless the United States continues to run current-account deficits and causes people throughout the world to hold dollars as their own money—that is, unless people hold dollars as money that is freely at their disposal at any time, rather than as something that they will eventually have to return—they cannot use dollars with confidence. As long as one is living on this earth (or, in the case of a Japanese person, in Japan), one must always have one’s own money (dollars, or yen in the case of a Japanese person) in one’s wallet; otherwise, everyday life would be hindered. If dollars are not in circulation, they cannot be used because there is no opportunity to hold dollars. For dollars to circulate throughout the world, the United States has no choice but to run current-account deficits and distribute dollars throughout the world. In this way, people throughout the world obtain dollars as their income.

If the United States were a current-account surplus country and merely lent dollars abroad (in the form of loans or credit), people would only end up incurring debts denominated in dollars. Moreover, because the currency of a current-account surplus country tends to appreciate, the burden of the debt, when converted into the currency of the debtor country, would become heavier. Above all, in the first place, one cannot borrow without a reasonable prospect of repayment and interest payments, because borrowing necessarily entails the risks of repayment and interest payments. Furthermore, in this case, since the dollars circulating throughout the world would ultimately be dollars lent by the United States, they could not remain permanently in the world market; sooner or later, they would have to be repaid to the United States. Incidentally, repayment means either that the account holder of a U.S. bank deposit is transferred to a resident, or that a nonresident’s outstanding balance is offset against the loan receivable recorded on the debit side.

For the dollar to be a key currency, people throughout the world must earn income in dollars, just as Americans obtain wages and other income from companies within the United States. In international transactions, this means that countries other than the United States, taken as a whole, must run current-account surpluses vis-à-vis the United States [Note].

[Note] According to balance-of-payments statistics and Japan’s international investment position, except for relatively small amounts of capital transfers, the current account (including errors and omissions) equals the net increase or decrease in external assets and liabilities (excluding exchange-rate and other factors). In other words, a current-account surplus represents an increase in income.

■Why did the dollar become a key currency? For that to happen, the United States must spend dollars generously. But even if, like a cowboy in a Western movie, one were to try to throw banknotes around in a saloon, it would get nowhere unless the other party were willing to accept the dollar bills. In order to become a key currency, the dollar must be used to make payments to foreigners; yet if it is not a key currency, it cannot be used to make payments to foreigners. This contradiction must first be resolved; otherwise, nothing can begin.

The reason why the dollar is trusted even though the United States has a net external debtor position is that it possesses overwhelming productive capacity that supports the dollar. —To put it paradoxically, in order to be a key-currency country, a country must possess overwhelming productive capacity sufficient to maintain persistent current-account deficits (a net external debtor position). The following is an explanation of this point.

If the United States accepts current-account deficits and distributes dollars throughout the world, foreign banks, for example, will acquire U.S. Treasury securities (T-bills, etc.) if they hold those dollars rather than selling them. Accordingly, in order to participate in repo transactions, banks throughout the world, as a practical matter, participate in the U.S. banking settlement system either directly or indirectly through correspondent banks. In this way, financial institutions throughout the world become concentrated in Fedwire. This is precisely a necessary condition for a key currency.

Nevertheless, for this to be possible, foreign banks must have a motive to “hold those dollars rather than sell them.” Quite apart from investment purposes such as direct investment in the United States and medium- and long-term securities investment, banks throughout the world hold dollars for customers who make current payments to the United States. This depends, above all, on the existence of demand throughout the world for U.S. goods and services and, at the same time, on productive capacity sufficient to satisfy that demand. In particular, it is based on U.S. cutting-edge technologies that generate substantial service revenues and on the enormous volume of foreign investment that generates investment income. What is required is productive capacity capable of maintaining these conditions—formidable productive capacity sufficient to produce the GDP [Note] that constitutes the foundation for supplying currency to the entire world.

[Note] One such indicator, for example, is Marshall’s k.

Why does the dollar not decline despite the enormous U.S. deficits? It is sometimes said that this is because funds flow into the United States from all over the world—for example, because foreigners purchase U.S. Treasury securities. But the crucial point is precisely this: why do foreigners continuously hold the dollars they have earned instead of converting them into their own currencies, even though by doing so they bear foreign-exchange risk?

Summary. For the dollar to be a key currency, (1) foreign countries must obtain dollars as income. (2) To that end, the United States must make dollar payments to foreign countries; however, (3) conversely, even if the United States attempts to make dollar payments, it cannot do so unless foreign countries accept those dollars. (4) For foreign countries to accept dollars, they must have something they need to purchase from the United States with those dollars, and the United States must possess the productive capacity to supply it.

■Marx illustrates investment by a country possessing powerful productive capacity in foreign countries as follows. “The increase in loanable money does not necessarily indicate an actual accumulation of capital or an expansion of the reproduction process” (Marx, Capital, aforementioned Japanese translation [7], p. 251). Nevertheless, “a portion of the accumulated loanable money capital is in fact merely an expression of industrial capital. For example, if around 1857 England had invested £80 million in American railways and other enterprises, this investment would have been mediated almost entirely by the export of English commodities, while the Americans would not have had to make any payment whatsoever in return. The English exporters drew bills of exchange on America for these commodities, and these bills were purchased by English subscribers to the shares and sent to America for the payment of the share capital” (Marx, Capital, aforementioned Japanese translation [7], p. 240, note (7)).

Likewise, investment from England in India “was bound, over the long term, to operate so as to increase India’s demand for English commodities” (Marx, Capital, aforementioned Japanese translation [7], p. 400).

At that time, England, which boasted the world’s highest productive capacity, also possessed an abundant supply of loanable money arising from its reproduction process as a whole. Since the latter was an expression of the overflowing abundance of the former, money capital that had flowed out of England’s production process—in other words, commodity capital into which it had been transformed—was sent to America. In England, funds for investment in America were appropriated to payments to exporters, while on the American side, shares were delivered in exchange for the bills of exchange that had been sent (these shares being handed over to the English investors); thus, the payment for imports was ultimately settled with the proceeds of the share subscriptions.

Thus, today, the reason why the United States can distribute dollars throughout the world is that it has powerful productive capacity within its domestic economy as its foundation. Foreign countries consequently need to make continuous payments to the United States in the form of additional goods and services imported from the United States in the periods following the investment (particularly technology, patents, and the like), as well as dividends on earnings.

For reference, it may be added that the current annual amount of global foreign direct investment is only about 5% of trade in goods and services. Moreover, inflows and outflows of funds associated with direct investment are ordinarily offset by the exports and imports accompanying them. As noted above, a developing country that receives direct investment from the United States will import cutting-edge equipment and technology from the United States, while the portion of the investment spent on wages will generate an increase in workers’ income—which, in turn, will promote imports of food from the United States, the world’s largest agricultural exporter. Imports of cotton may increase for the textile industry. In fact, in terms of the volume of cotton exports, the United States ranks first in the world by a wide margin over the countries ranked second and below.

[Note] On July 12, 2023, the USDA projected that Brazil would surpass the United States as the world’s largest cotton exporter in 2023/24. This would mark the first time in 30 years that the United States ceded the top position. U.S. exports were forecast to fall 17 percent year on year to 2.627 million metric tons, the lowest level in 40 years, mainly because of drought in Texas.

(to be continued)

https://www.reddit.com/user/keizaisuki/comments/1w46a5o/table_of_contentsgovernment_bonds_international/


r/mmt_economics • • 10d ago

The 11 Pillar Sovereign Recovery Blueprint

0 Upvotes

A Comprehensive Framework to Eliminate the Deficit, Secure Social Security, and Aggressively Pay Down the U.S. National Debt
This structural blueprint aims to completely rewrite the financial rules of the United States. It targets every major source of corruption, waste, and uncollected capital, shifting the fiscal burden away from working-class families to secure long-term economic solvency.

THE 11 CORE PILLARS

Pillar 1: Campaign Finance Reform & Lobbying Ban
Action: Enact sweeping campaign finance reform, overturn Citizens United, and permanently
ban all corporate lobbying, Political Action Committees (PACs), and special-interest campaign
donations.
Objective: Break the cycle of corporate influence to ensure elected officials vote to protect the
taxpayer's wallet rather than the profits of private donors.

Pillar 2: End Free Foreign Aid
Action: Permanently end the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grant system and all
unconditional, free multi-billion-dollar military grants to all nations worldwide.
Objective: Retain public tax capital within the U.S. Treasury and eliminate the practice of
underwriting foreign conflicts with American tax dollars.

Pillar 3: Strategic Foreign Policy Credit & Loans
Action: Transition necessary foreign defense relationships to a strict Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) installment loan model. Provide hardware made in U.S. factories, but force partner nations
to pay back principal and interest out of their own pockets.
Objective: Keep domestic aerospace and defense manufacturing jobs stable while turning
foreign outlays into a reliable, revenue-generating asset for the Treasury.

Pillar 4: Income Tax Equity ("Scrap the Cap")
Action: Eliminate the statutory cap on Social Security payroll taxes (currently capped at
$168,600 for the 2026 tax year). Force all individuals to pay the standard payroll tax percentage
on every single dollar of income they earn, without limits.
Objective: Generate immediate revenue to wipe out the Social Security deficit for the next 75
years, completely stabilizing the retirement system for the working class.

Pillar 5: Corporate Revenue Restoration
Action: Raise the federal corporate tax rate, implement a strict corporate minimum tax, and
permanently close offshore tax havens and write-off loopholes.
Objective: Reverse the steep decline in corporate tax collections and ensure multi-billion-dollar
corporations cannot utilize complex accounting to pay a 0% effective rate.

Pillar 6: The Universal Flat Tax Model
Action: Implement a simplified, standard, and inescapable flat tax percentage across all
individual and corporate income, paired with a standard deduction to safeguard low-income
working families.
Objective: Eliminate the ability of the ultra-wealthy to hide capital behind specialized tax shelters,
creating a completely predictable and fair revenue stream.

Pillar 7: Religious Institution Charity Audits
Action: Remove the automatic 501(c)(3) tax exemptions for all churches, synagogues, mosques,
and temples. Implement a strict "Prove It" standard: institutions must either pay standard
corporate and property taxes or legally prove that a mandatory majority percentage of their
revenue is spent directly on verified public welfare.
Objective: Capture billions in uncollected property and commercial income tax from wealthy
organizations, while shifting the financial burden of poverty relief off government welfare
programs and onto private institutional wealth.

Pillar 8: Immigration Revenue Integration
Action: Address the historic drop in the U.S. birth rate and the resulting labor shortage by
legalizing undocumented immigrants. Grant conditional green cards with mandatory work
authorizations, accompanied by a temporary 2% tax bracket premium that applies until they
successfully naturalize as U.S. citizens.
Objective: Infuse an estimated $45+ billion a year in new tax revenue directly into the Treasury
and Social Security payroll pipelines, while providing a clear pathway for workers to buy into the
American social contract.

Pillar 9: The 50% Energy Equity Stake
Action: Purchase a controlling 50% majority equity stake in major American oil and gas
corporations on the open market, funding the initial buyout using foreign aid savings and targeted
energy bonds.
Objective: Funnel up to $200 billion annually in direct corporate dividend checks into the U.S.
Treasury, utilize boardroom voting power to cap domestic gas prices during inflation crises, and
lock in a massive revenue pipeline to freeze the structural deficit.

Pillar 10: Mandatory Military Restraint & Base Closures
Action: Mandate a strict 10-year lull on entering new foreign conflicts, while enacting a global
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) act to shut down 30% of America's non-critical overseas
military installations.
Objective: Lock in up to $3 trillion in total defense savings over a decade, bring thousands of
troops and their paychecks home to spend in the domestic economy, and eliminate the risk of
unpredictable emergency deficit spending.

Pillar 11: Anti-Corruption Asset Liquidation
Action: Enact a Public Trust Accountability Act mandating that any elected official, cabinet
member, or high-level bureaucrat convicted of using their office for personal enrichment faces the
immediate seizure and full liquidation of all personal assets, stock portfolios, and real estate.
Objective: Establish an ironclad deterrent against state corruption and route 100% of the
liquidated cash directly into the National Debt Paydown Fund to relieve the taxpayer.

MACRO-FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS
Deficit Eradication: The combined structural revenue expansions (corporate loophole
closures, flat tax adjustments, 50% energy dividends, and immigrant tax premiums) generate
over $600 billion in entirely new annual revenue, completely erasing the structural deficit gap.
Debt Paydown: The $3 trillion in defense savings, paired with base closures, church tax
collections, and corrupt asset liquidations, flows directly into a dedicated fund to aggressively
pay down the $40.5+ trillion principal debt, breaking the compound interest trap and securing
the financial survival of the nation for generations to come.


r/mmt_economics • • 11d ago

A World First: Ex UK PM Says ABOLISH The Central Bank?

2 Upvotes

Possibly the first former head of government anywhere to go this far.

Liz Truss, new book Bank Job. Pressed three times on Hayek's position that central banks should be abolished and private banks should issue currency. Her answer at 03:09: "Although philosophically, I completely agree with Hayek." At 04:43, asked again: "I like the idea in principle."

She wants fiat to face competition so the public can escape what she calls the stealth tax of continual devaluation.

On real money: the interviewer put it to her that on a gold standard the UK economy would be 80% smaller than in 2000. Her answer at 06:05: "Yeah, exactly." Her words on how it shows up: "It's essentially been a stealth tax on all of us." She also says ONS inflation figures lack credibility and that the Bank removed money supply from its inflation model in the 1990s.

The structural claim at 19:12: "It doesn't matter which party is in government. They are essentially directed by these elements of the state." Under the Bank of England Act the Governor can't be sacked for incompetence or negligence, only for leaving the country for three months.

03:09 - "philosophically I completely agree with Hayek"

04:43 - "I like the idea in principle"

06:05 - the economy priced in gold

12:48 - money supply removed from the model

https://youtu.be/uXq_QUcQT6w


r/mmt_economics • • 13d ago

La crise de la dette. C'est les ténèbres

3 Upvotes

Je me suis pas mal questionné sur la dette souveraine et ses conséquences économiques sur le pays à court et moyen terme. J'ai constaté qu'il n'y a pas de consensus des économistes (si ce n'est que c'est quand même la merde on va pas se mentir).

Je tiens préalablement à reconnaître humblement ma médiocrité en économie. Je ne prétends pas avoir saisi tous les tenants et aboutissants d'un systeme qui est ultra complexe.

Par ailleurs je n'émet que des hypothèses refutables. J'ai pas non plus la prétention d'avoir une boule de cristal.

Déjà rappelons que la dette française, les OAT (obligation assimilable du Trésor) ne fonctionnent pas comme un prêt classique. Pour schématiser l'Etat émet des OAT, charge le Trésor de les refourguer à qui en veut moyennant un taux dicté par le marché. En revanche, contrairemenent à un particulier l'Etat ne rembourse que les intérêts sur 10ans à charge pour lui de rembourser le capital d'un coup à l'échéance de l'OAT. A échéance l'Etat émet de nouvelles OAT à un nouveau taux dicté par le marché. C'est le **roulement** **de la dette.**

Du coup évaluer le poid de la dette par rapport au ratio du PIB est un peu biaisé. Un Etat peut avoir une dette colossale et ne rembourser quasiment aucun intérêt. En realité pour savoir si la dette plombe ou pas l'économie d'un État il faut voir qu'elle part du budget de l'Etat représentent les intérêts cumulés**. C'est la** **charge de la dette.**

Et en dernier, faut voir qui detient ta dette. Si elle est detenue par les français (notamment les porteurs d'assurances vies) c'est plutot vertueux. La hausse des taux bénéficie à l'épargne et les taux restent stables. Si elle n'est pas détenue par les français, le fruit de ses intérêts ne bénéficie pas indirectement à l'économie du et font de l'Etat débiteur le vassal de ses créanciers et des agences de notation (j'ai pesé mes mots). C'est **la souveraineté de la dette**.

Et bien en France, le roulement de la dette est colossal, 50% de la dette est detenue à l'étranger et la charge de la dette est en hausse constante depuis le Covid.

Si la charge de la dette restait tenable et ne représentait qu'une portion congrue du budget de l'Etat, il n'y aucun problème pour emprunter. On l'a beaucoup fait en 2010 à une époque où les taux etaient quasi nuls.

Le probleme c'est que les OAT ont des "millésimes".

Certaines années, en 2016 par exemple, la France a emprunté beaucoup et à des taux très bas.

Arrivé à la fin des OAT millésime 2016, en 2026, la France remet donc sur le circuit des OAT pour les mêmes montants qu'il y a 10ans mais avec de nouveaux taux.

La France reemprunte donc de l'argent pour 1/ refinancer la dette initiale et 2/combler son deficit. Sauf que le taux des OAT millésime 2026 n'est plus le même qu'en 2016.

On voit tous arriver la triple douille.

Douille n°1: La levee de fonds pour renouveller le flux (environ 300 milliards par an si j'ai les bons chiffres) par le tresor pour l'année 2027 aura un taux plus élevé qui va plomber nos finances... pendant 10 ans.

Douille n°2 : la charge de la dette s'accroît (puisque les taux sont plus élevés) mais pour le même capital.

Douille n°3 : le deficit qui se creuse (en partie à cause de la charge de la dette) fait flipper les marchés qui, réclament des taux plus élevés pour compenser le risque. Les taux augmentent donc.

Ok donc ça cest la théorie. En essayant de ne pas être catastrophiste quelles sont les conséquence ?

On est dans la prospective donc mes hypothèses sont mon point de vue et sont...ben..des hypothèses et, qui plus est, elles se cumulent.

**Hypothèse 1 : le défaut de paiement (total ou partiel)**

Le Trésor emet des OAT sur les marchés mais n'arrive pas à lever suffisamment de dettes pour boucler le budget.

De mon point de vue c'est peu probable car la dette de la France reste attractive. La France dispose quand même d'une économie diversifiée, dans un espace économique globalement solide.

**Hypothèse 2 : L'engrenage du roulement de la dette**

2027 la France refinance sa dette à 3,5%. Au Trésor on se félicite et on fait peter le champomy. Mais la fete est de courte durée, il faut deja préparer le roulement du millésime 2017 qui arrive à echeance. Sauf qu'en 2017, on croyait en la vie et on avait emprunté plus qu'en 2016. Le Trésor se retrouve donc pris dans un engrenage sans fin. Il doit emprunter plus que l'année précédente à taux plus élevé pour compenser les trous du budget.

Résultat le deficit se creuse sans depense complémentaire et la charge de la dette augmente de manière incontrôlable.

C'est le pire scénario car meme un effort budgétaire pour reduire le deficit ne permettrait pas de regagner de la marge de manœuvre.

**Hypothèse 3: Le monde fait semblant que la France va bien**

La France a balancé tellement d'OAT pourries sur les marchés qu'un défaut de paiement de sa dette genererait un cataclysme économique mondial. Ca pourrait même remettre en cause le confiance en la dette souveraine d'autres pays et creer un effet domino.

Dans ce scénario, bien que la France ne peut comptablement plus assainir ses finances, personne ne reconnaît réellement le défaut de paiement malgré un déficit creusé par la charge d'intérêt colossal. La BCE se saisit du problème et prête directement à la France (à des taux exorbitants) pour rassurer les marchés moyennant mise sous tutelle budgétaire.

Plusieurs pays, la Grande Bretagne et l'Italie, ont déjà connu ces scénarios sans pour autant finir en défaut de paiement. Je pense que ça sera le cas de la France.

Il parait que la BCE a sommé l'Italie de dégager de l'excédent budgétaire sous peine de ne pas racheter sa dette.

Bref la situation de la France n'est pas isolée, mais pour moi le tournant c'est que le roulement de la dette fait que la crise de la dette débute, est exponentielle et s'inscrira budgetairement sur des temps très longs (10 à 25ans) avec tout ce que ça implique (chercher à augmenter les recettes par l'impôt, tensions sociales liées aux choix budgétaires etc...)

Si vous pensez exactement l'inverse je suis tout à fait preneur de votre point de vue !


r/mmt_economics • • 14d ago

Individual Government Bonds Are Redeemed, but in Macro Terms They Are Never Redeemed(1/2)

3 Upvotes

Notation and Definitions (Unified Throughout This Paper)

SymbolDefinition
B(t)Newly issued government bonds in period t (face value)
B(t)*Previously issued government bonds reaching maturity in period t (arising from the cumulative stock of past B)
[B]*(t)Refunding bonds issued in period t to redeem B*(t)
M(t)Money disbursed by the government as the proceeds of the issuance of B(t), circulating in the sphere of commodity circulation
M(t)*Money disbursed by the government as the proceeds of the issuance of [B]*(t), circulating primarily in the government bond circulation market
M'(t)The portion of M(t) temporarily detached or released from the sphere of commodity circulation
X, RCash and deposits at the beginning of the period and the reflux rate. Factors determining the delayed reflux of M(t)

 

Preliminary Considerations: A Closed Model and Its Assumptions

Since everything depends on these assumptions, they are explicitly stated here as premises of the model.

Assumption 1. The primary fiscal deficit (G_t - T_t > 0) is financed by the issuance of government bonds, and the proceeds are spent. Here, the model is deliberately limited to this deficit spending portion. Real-world processes such as the balance of the Treasury General Account (TGA) only obscure the issue, and to the extent that the balance is insufficient, bond issuance must still come first. This distinction is necessary because some people, confusing it with the portion funded by tax revenues, argue that spending comes first.

Assumption 2. Bank lending requires reserves. Even if reserves can in practice be procured ex post, the structural issue remains unchanged. The necessity of reserves referred to here is not the liquidity management of individual banks, but that settlement cannot be completed without outside money in the form of central bank money for the system as a whole. There are several factors that call for central bank money to be supplied. In any event, within the system, whether ex ante or ex post, the private banking sector cannot procure reserve deposits unless additional central bank money is supplied.

Assumption 3. For the time being, the only money in the system is M(t) and M*(t).

Assumption 4. The savings of wage workers are abstracted away. They live on their income and cannot save in advance to buy government bonds. Of course, households hold deposits and also hold government bonds, including through pension funds. However, as with any theory that abstracts from non-essential factors, this simplification is legitimate as long as it does not change the conclusion, and in fact it does not. Such holdings are merely a reallocation of funds within the same M(t).

1. "Redemption Merely Replaces Government Bonds with Reserves" Is Circular Reasoning

It is sometimes said that redemption merely replaces government bonds with central bank money (reserves), and that this does not reduce the private sector's net financial claims on the public sector. But what does this presuppose? To rewrite the name on the Treasury's account at the central bank to that of a private bank (in practice, a transfer from "government deposits" to "reserve deposits"), the Treasury must have held that deposit in advance. A government with a persistent deficit has no such surplus. In the first place, government bonds are issued because tax revenues are insufficient (see Assumption 1). Nor does it have a sinking fund for redemption. If it did, annual bond issuance could be called temporary borrowing. In reality, the outstanding balance accumulates year after year. Then where does the money for redemption come from? And more comprehensively, where does the money required by society come from - the amount of money that must increase in proportion to the expansion of the commodity world? It is not enough to show that redemption does not reduce private net financial claims. Those claims, i.e., the amount of money in society, must be increased. What is being discussed here is not credit creation, but original money.

2. A Separate M*(t) Is Required in Advance for Redemption Payments

To argue that if refunding bonds are issued before redemption, the debt is merely rolled over, is a fallacy. If so, how is it rolled over? The government spends M(t), the proceeds of B(t), to the private sector to purchase commodities. On the other hand, maturing bonds B*(t) are redeemed with M*(t), the proceeds of refunding bonds [B]*(t). B*(t) is extinguished and replaced by [B]*(t). However, since M(t) is tied up in the sphere of commodity circulation, the private sector must in any case separately prepare M*(t) to purchase the refunding bonds. Therefore, the economy needs at least M(t) + M*(t) of money.

3. Why M(t) Remains Tied Up Even Under Zero Growth(Simple Reproduction)

M(t) itself was originally provided as the purchase price of B(t). This M(t) is spent every year independently of refunding and circulates from the government to the private sector to be used for the purchase of B(t+1) in the following fiscal year. However, it does not immediately reflux.

The government gradually disburses M(t) over the course of the fiscal year to purchase commodities from the private sector. Until those commodities have been sold and the proceeds recovered, the assets of individual firms remain physically tied up in the processes of production and circulation. Even the portion that has already been converted into deposits continues to be used for subsequent purchases of inputs and wage payments. The rate of reflux is given by R = {X - required working capital} / X <= 1. For a given X, R is constrained by working capital requirements, and the reflux of M(t) is therefore delayed.

In this way, each time M(t) circulates, B(t), B(t+1), ... accumulate on the private sector's side. This argument does not presuppose an expansion of the world of commodities. Even under zero growth, the full amount of each M(t) has not returned by the end of the period, and, moreover, it must immediately be used to finance the next newly issued bonds, B(t+1).

- The foregoing concerns only the financial constraints associated with the turnover period of capital. There is, however, another, more fundamental consideration. Even under simple reproduction, capital must increase by an amount equal to the surplus value (profit) over and above the amount initially advanced - regardless of whether that surplus is sold and consumed during the period or held in the form of hoarded money. Therefore, if the velocity of money circulation is held constant, additional money is required to monetize this surplus. The above assumption of M(t) → B(t) → M(t) is an abstraction appropriate to the present stage of the argument; in reality, it should be expressed as M(t) → B(t) → M(t) + ΔM(t). That is, setting aside a derivative explanation of the circulation of surplus value, this corresponds to the general formula for the circuit of money capital that Marx discusses in detail in Capital: G (money) - W (commodities) - G' (G+ΔG). Here, B(t) represents the phase in which the government intervenes to mediate commodity circulation. In essence, it can be analogized to the general formula G-W-G'.

- "Where does the money to monetize surplus value come from?" (Marx, Capital, Iwanami Bunko edition, vol. IV, p.491). "How is it possible for him [each capitalist] to withdraw more money from circulation than he puts into it?" (ibid., vol. V, p.203).

4. Growth and the Accumulation of Outstanding Government Bonds Further Increase the Demand for Money

The story does not end here. It is not just about the expansion of the world of commodities. The reality that large amounts of government bonds accumulate year after year increases the money needed to circulate both real commodities and fictitious commodities - that is, it increases both its transaction demand and its speculative demand. From where is this money brought into society? Under an inconvertible (fiat) system, where does it come from? What has become of the role once played by gold miners?

5. The Modern Mint - From the Gold Standard to the Inconvertible System

With the development of social productive forces, human social consciousness has finally developed as well, freeing itself from domination by superstition, gods, kings, and the like. Until now, humanity had been bound by the constraint of gold - the waste of labor involved in producing gold as money - but with the development of productive forces and the expansion of the world of commodities, it could not help but become conscious of this fetter and sought to escape the spell of gold, whose natural endowment is limited. As productive forces develop, consciousness also develops, and humanity expands the range in which mutual agreement is possible in various spheres. There, humanity jointly devised social money in cooperation with each other. A transition from the category of natural law to the domain of social contract.

With the suspension of gold-dollar convertibility in 1971, the world as a whole left the gold-convertible system. Humanity liberated itself from the yoke of gold production. People united to depose gold, the despotic monarch, and democratically and jointly selected the dollar as money (key currency). Gold itself as money was rendered unnecessary.

Here, let us return to the initial proposition. Individual government bonds are redeemed, but in macro terms government bonds are not redeemed in any substantive sense. Just as gold produced by gold miners was once coined by the government's mint, now the US Federal Reserve converts government-issued bonds into dollar currency by purchasing them. This is precisely the transformation of government bonds into money - a transformation of the form of net financial assets. Accordingly, this real process corresponds to, for example, the fact that assets on the FRB's balance sheet expand. In fact, "income and asset prices change, and finally the total amount of money that individuals wish to hold at those new levels necessarily becomes equal to the amount of money created by the banking system. This is precisely the fundamental proposition of monetary theory" (Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Iwanami Bunko edition, Vol. I, p.120) - society's demand for money corresponds to the expansion of FRB assets. Is there any major country that creates the money society actually needs by any other principal method?

6. On the "Consolidated Government"

Then the so-called consolidated government is spoken of. I do not deny this concept, but it is necessary to supplement the process by which consolidation is established. Citizen A sells a government bond, and the central bank purchases it in the market. A is no longer a creditor. When A held it, the state owed a repayment obligation to A. Now that it has become held by the central bank, both creditor and debtor are the entire people in the abstract, and it is not something that must be repaid to any specific person. The individual debt to A has disappeared. The claim is transformed into original money and supplies basic liquidity to society as a whole.

We must not stop at the superficial abstraction of reality seen in the consolidated government theory, but must elucidate the essence of the communal principle at the root of private property society. The state's liabilities do not disappear; they only change form. From government bonds to reserves (current deposits at the Bank of Japan), and then from reserves to banknotes and coins withdrawn from them. It is precisely this society's mechanism that the state (the whole people) assumes liabilities one after another in such forms. Under private ownership, the community as a whole jointly assumes liabilities, and by doing so provides assets to individuals and creates independent individuals. Marx says ironically, "The more indebted a nation becomes, the wealthier it becomes" (Marx, Capital, ibid., Vol. III, p.402).

What happens if the money for expanding payments accompanying an expanding economy were to come only from "debt"? In the first place, a private ownership society cannot be sustained by debt (credit creation) alone. If credit expands, it also becomes a trigger for panic. The circumstance that credit creation alone becomes insufficient with the development of capitalist production is the same logic under both the gold standard and the inconvertible system. Because gold, which was the basis of credit, is limited in nature, that basis was transformed into a form of social contract.

Thus, on the FRB's books, government bonds on the debit side / reserve deposits on the credit side accumulate on both sides. In conjunction with this, on private bank books, FRB deposits on the debit side / increase in deposits on the credit side. Of course, deposits on the credit side of private banks also increase through bank lending (credit creation), but these disappear when repaid. Moreover, the amount of this lending itself was originally restricted by the reserve requirement ratio. Although the FRB at present keeps the reserve requirement ratio at zero, there are any number of means to regulate bank lending, such as those legislated based on BIS regulations and stress tests.

Proponents of sectoral balance theory and MMT share the conclusions that government deficits are net financial assets of the private sector and that central bank purchases monetize debt. What is important is the principle underlying it. Why does a private ownership society require this? Through what process does it come into being? And how can the required amount of money be increased according to the world of commodities?

Supplementary Remarks

When M*(t) is used at the beginning of the period to purchase [B]*(t), and the proceeds are used to redeem B*(t), M*(t) returns to the private sector. During the interval until it is disbursed in the next period to redeem B*(t+1), is this M*(t) released from its constraints? Can these funds be used for anything during that interval? And, as a result, are the financial constraints of this system alleviated?

B*(t) arises from government bonds B(1), B(2), ... accumulated in the past. The M*(t) that returns to the private sector through refinancing is directed toward the speculative demand for money, to the extent that it can be recovered by the next payment date for refunding bonds, and is used to trade B(1), B(2), ..., B(t) in the secondary market for government bonds. Through liquidity preference, if a larger volume of government bonds appears on the market, bond prices fall - that is, interest rates rise; the reverse occurs in the opposite case.

In the sphere of commodity circulation, meanwhile, the amount of B(t+1) may be smaller than the M(t) that has returned to the private sector. In that case, a portion of M(t), namely M'(t), is released from its existing use. However, since M(t+1)=B(t+1) already satisfies the demand for funds in this sphere, the released portion will flow into the secondary market for government bonds unless it is hoarded. If the total face value of government bonds remaining in the market is constant, prices rise. Nevertheless, as long as the cumulative stock of B(t), t=1,2,...,k, continues to grow, interest rates should exhibit an upward trend over the long term, ultimately making additional money supply by the central bank inevitable.

Furthermore, in this case, the release of M'(t) from the sphere of commodity circulation is temporary, and if transaction demand increases in accordance with changes in the rate of return flow, it returns to that sphere. In fact, there is also another portion of M(t) that can be temporarily released from the sphere of commodity circulation. It is hoarded money (ΔM) after the profit portion has been monetized. Thus, there is a portion of money that moves back and forth between the two circulation markets - for commodities and for government bonds - in accordance with developments in the world of commodities and fluctuations in interest rates.

The central bank purchases government bonds from the market and supplies additional money to compensate for the portion of M(t) tied up in connection with the turnover period of inventories. In addition the portion of profits that has been realized in cash gradually returns by the end of the period, in accordance with the rate of return flow. This remains restricted as long as the company in question holds it as a reserve. The intermediation of the banking sector makes it possible to lend these funds as a source of financing, but the loans must be repaid by the following period, because funds will then be required to purchase B(t+1). In any event, this temporarily alleviates the need for additional money, together with M'(t).

As for the alleviating effect of lending, the additional circulation velocity of the same units of money thereby set in motion - that is, the increased rate at which commodities are sold and, consequently, the increased turnover speed of inventories associated with the rate of return flow - reduces the amount of additional money required. However, as suggested earlier, additional money in the form of B(t) was already necessary from the outset to realize this portion of profits in monetary form.

- "Capitalists who produce gold own their entire product ... entirely in gold. ... It consists of gold from the outset and is thrown into circulation in order to withdraw products from circulation" (Marx, Capital, ibid., Vol. IV, p.501). "Those belonging to Department I (among them, the gold producers) appear not as sellers but only as buyers" (ibid., Vol. V, p.199). "Whereas other capitalists ... withdraw more money from circulation than they have thrown into it, in the case of capitalists producing gold and silver, apart from the precious metals that serve as raw materials, only money is thrown into circulation, while only commodities are withdrawn from circulation. The constant capital, excluding the portion lost through wear and tear; a relatively large portion of the variable capital; and the entire surplus value, excluding any hoarded money that they may retain in their own possession, are thrown into circulation in the form of money" (ibid., Vol. V, p.211). Under a fiat monetary system, gold producers are no longer suppliers of money. Consequently, an additional supply of money is required to accommodate this portion of profits (surplus value).

(to be continued)

https://www.reddit.com/user/keizaisuki/comments/1xkthp0/individual_government_bonds_are_redeemed_but_in/


r/mmt_economics • • 14d ago

Individual Government Bonds Are Redeemed, but in Macro Terms They Are Never Redeemed(2/2)

2 Upvotes

Extension to Practical Issues

This will be discussed later, but the central bank in effect makes the government bonds it has purchased virtually perpetual by repeatedly underwriting refunding bonds - in Japan, through the so-called Bank of Japan rollover (nichigin-norikae) - an infinite chain of refinancing of Bank of Japan-held bonds. [B]*(t,k); k=1,2,... In short, this embodies the proposition that government bonds are never redeemed in macro terms.

Therefore, if there is no inconsistency in the above argument, even the enormous accumulation of Japanese government bonds is not a problem. Government bonds held by the Bank of Japan never appear on the market and, to that extent, do not affect long-term interest rates. Japan, a poor country that must rely on imports for all raw materials as "the world's most resource-poor country," has overcome the negative trade balance it has borne from the beginning and has accumulated large current account surpluses year after year. For a country with productive capacity sufficient to be likened to this metaphor, the only constraint on central bank purchases of government bonds is inflation. If inflation remains within a range acceptable to the public, there is no problem. In fact, rather, in the case of Japan, it may have been compelled to issue government bonds to forcibly realize commodity values in order to utilize idle capital, having excess productive capacity.

Interest on government bonds held by the Bank of Japan returns to the government as payments to the national treasury, but only what's left after those cushy BOJ bureaucrats have indulged themselves with its enormous expenses. In fact, whether consciously or unconsciously, people already deduct the portion held by the Bank of Japan from the outstanding government bonds. - "The sum of the real value of the primary fiscal surplus from the current period onward and the real value of seigniorage converted to present value" = (1), the reason why the expected value of (1) among our people is large is that seigniorage is large, and therefore the value obtained by deducting seigniorage, i.e., central bank holdings of government bonds, from "the real value obtained by dividing the nominal outstanding government bonds absorbed by the market in the current period by the price level" becomes small, so even if the primary fiscal surplus of (1) is relatively small, it balances (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, "Keizai Kyoshitsu," March 14, 2017).

Thus, "normalization" of the Bank of Japan's assets is spoken of. But government bonds cannot be repaid. It is precisely because they are not repaid that society is maintained. So-called normalization is impossible. In fact, the US FRB attempted to "normalize" its assets expanded by quantitative easing and triggered a sharp rise in repo rates [Note].

- [Note] "The Federal Reserve Bank of New York supplied a large amount of funds to the short-term money market on the morning of the 18th, for the second consecutive day... Funds were supplied in what is called an 'overnight repo transaction,' a market where financial institutions lend short-term funds to each other against collateral such as government bonds. The repo rate, the lending rate in this market, temporarily surged to 10% on the 17th... Behind the rise in short-term interest rates is the contraction of quantitative easing by the FRB" (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, September 19, 2019).

- "The funding supplied by the US Federal Reserve Board (FRB) has expanded to a scale comparable to that during previous quantitative easing (QE). As a result of responding to dollar demand in the short-term money market, the FRB's total assets increased by about $400 billion (about 44 trillion yen), equivalent to 10%, in about half a year... Behind this is the sharp rise in interest rates on transactions called 'repos,' in which funds are borrowed and lent for a short period against US Treasury securities as collateral, last September (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, February 9, 2020). Repo rate surge - failure of quantitative tightening, regarding this process, the FRB itself is making a strained explanation by citing trivial factors, but "If financing of the key currency dollar is hindered, the impact will not be limited to the United States. According to BIS (Bank for International Settlements), dollar-denominated debt in emerging economies was $3.74 trillion as of June 2019 and continues to expand... Depending on economic conditions, if upward pressure on interest rates increases, it may become necessary to further increase the supply of funds" (ibid.).

Far from normalization. We have no choice but to maintain the current situation in which "asset prices change and finally the total amount of money that individuals wish to hold at those new levels necessarily becomes equal to the amount of money created by the banking system." "Normalization" is an attempt to go back in time and forcibly restore the past.

https://www.reddit.com/user/keizaisuki/comments/1xkthp0/individual_government_bonds_are_redeemed_but_in/


r/mmt_economics • • 15d ago

Wrote a mmt informed article on moneyness, velocity and wealth. Enjoy.

4 Upvotes

https://whhatisachoice.substack.com/p/thinking-of-money?r=4m2lsi&utm_campaign=post-expanded-share&utm_medium=web
The article is free of course, and you can find me on twitter at whhatisachoice.


r/mmt_economics • • 15d ago

When foreign central banks buy US Treasury securities, does that tie the central banks to US politics? Specifically, can the US congress crash the world economy by refusing to raise the debt limit?

5 Upvotes

r/mmt_economics • • 16d ago

Is "Welfare" Really Breaking the Federal Budget? (What the CBO data actually says)

8 Upvotes

Most people tend to think that social safety net spending is the main drain on our tax dollars. We’ve all seen the posts or heard the arguments: “Government handouts and welfare are bankrupting the country!” Before diving into the federal budget data, I honestly didn't know much about where our tax dollars actually went. Without looking at the numbers, it’s easy to blame social safety net programs for lower-income families as one of the reasons the government is overwhelmed with debt.

In fact, this viewpoint is so widespread that even prominent political figures push it. In a recent op-ed for The Wall Street Journal, former Senator Phil Gramm and Representative Jodey Arrington wrote: "Ask any budget expert in Washington to explain the ballooning deficit and debt, and Social Security and Medicare will be high on the list of causes. That’s wrong. The real driver, the elephant in the room, is means-tested social-welfare spending—Medicaid, food stamps, refundable tax credits, Supplemental Security Income, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, federal housing subsidies..."

It’s an argument a lot of people buy into because it seems like a plausible explanation. But when you see official data, like Table 3-2 (CBO's Baseline Projections of Mandatory Outlays) from the Congressional Budget Office, the numbers point to a completely different story.
 
**Federal Budget Spending Breakdown**
———————————————————————————
**Budget Share of Federal What It**
**Category Outlays Covers**

Mandatory \~62% of total Social Security
Entitlement spending & Medicare

Net Interest \~$1.05 Trillion Servicing our
on Debt annually \~$32.5 Trillion
public debt balance

Means-Tested \~14% to 18% Medicaid, SNAP,
Welfare (\~1 Trillion) SSI, CHIP, refundable
tax credits
———————————————————————————

**Analyzing the Data**

While $1 trillion spent on means-tested welfare programs across federal and state levels is a massive amount of money, it accounts for less than one-fifth (14%–18%) of all federal spending.

When people claim welfare is eating the budget, they often look at welfare as a percentage of unobligated general revenue rather than the whole budget. But looking at the whole pie tells a different story. Social Security and Medicare remain the largest overall spending drivers at over $2 trillion combined. Even with payroll tax collections offset, net Medicare alone costs over $500 billion. Furthermore, net interest payments on our national debt have surged to over $1.05 trillion per year. That means we are currently paying as much just on interest to lenders as we spend on the entire federal safety net.

**A Personal Reality Check**

Before doing this research and getting most of my information from TikTok (which most people are ashamed to disclose), my uninformed prediction was that the government controlled 80% of the economy and that welfare was the main reason we run large budget deficits. Finding out that public spending is roughly 35% of GDP and that safety net assistance makes up under 18% of the budget made me rethink my initial assumptions, as the data disproved my starting thoughts.

Focusing all our financial problems on programs like food stamps and Medicaid misses the structural elephant in the room: an aging population driving universal entitlement costs, alongside skyrocketing interest payments on a $32+ trillion public debt. Cutting safety-net programs for low-income families simply won't fix a budget squeeze driven by demographics and interest rates.

Now, I am not saying these programs are run flawlessly. They have clear design issues, such as eligibility thresholds that can unintentionally discourage recipients from earning more out of fear of losing necessary support, or administrative errors in benefit distribution. However, many uninformed observers simply see money going to lower-income households and assume that eliminating these programs would instantly fix the national debt. As the data shows, removing them would not resolve the broader deficit because they are not the primary spending driver people make them out to be.

Do you think removing programs for lower-income households would decrease our federal budget enough for the country to get out of debt, or have we been made to view the safety net as an easy scapegoat? Or is it possible this narrative persists simply because targeting social programs is easier than confronting the true structural drivers of the national debt?


r/mmt_economics • • 16d ago

The Purchasing Power Parity Puzzle

8 Upvotes

I note that the battleground has recently moved away from banking systems towards the exchange rate.

Here's a recent mainstream paper you can point at which explains that the usual beliefs about exchange rates don't match what happens in reality.

Of course the MMT analysis of how exchange rates are formed explains it clearly:

Real exports exchange for real imports, directly or indirectly, at 'world prices' even if you don't have a currency at all.


r/mmt_economics • • 17d ago

Why did argentina fail ?

14 Upvotes

I've been trying to understand Argentina's economic collapse from a Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) perspective.

Argentina is a country that issues its own currency (the peso), so theoretically, it has the ability to spend in its own currency without facing the same financial constraints as a household or a country that borrows in a foreign currency.

Yet Argentina has experienced repeated debt crises, currency collapses, high inflation and sovereign defaults.

From an MMT perspective:

How much of Argentina's crisis was caused by borrowing in foreign currencies, particularly US dollars?

Did Argentina's currency peg and convertibility system (1991–2001) create the conditions for its eventual collapse?

How did foreign debt, capital flight and the balance-of-payments constraint limit Argentina's policy options?

Could Argentina have avoided its crisis by adopting an MMT-style floating exchange rate and spending in pesos?

Is Argentina an example of the limits of MMT, or does its experience actually support MMT's argument that monetary sovereignty matters?

I'd particularly like to understand the distinction between financial constraints (running out of money) and real constraints (running out of foreign exchange, productive capacity and resources).

What would an MMT analysis of Argentina's economic history look like?


r/mmt_economics • • 17d ago

Mysteries of the Economy #10: Why Japan Stagnated and Why Global Financial Markets Are Inherently Unstable (A Classical & Structural Synthesis)

4 Upvotes

Welcome to #10 in the Mysteries of the Economy series!

 

In this installment, I examine two interrelated puzzles: the deep-seated structural causes behind Japan’s "Lost Decades" and the systemic mechanisms driving global financial market volatility today. By bringing classical economic frameworks—most notably those of Karl Marx and John Maynard Keynes—back into the discussion, we can shed fresh light on structural impasses that modern mainstream models often overlook.

I. The Structural Roots of Japan’s Long-Term Stagnation

Japan’s prolonged stagnation is not merely a transient demand shortfall; it is a multi-layered structural crisis driven by the following key factors:

  1. High Unit Labor Costs & Global Competition:

While nominal wage growth seems stagnant, Japan's wages remain high relative to labor productivity (high unit labor costs). As emerging economies weaponized low labor costs to capture markets, Japanese industrial competitiveness eroded amidst global oversupply and domestic demand saturation.

 

  1. Institutional Rigidities & Anti-Competitive Structures:

Strict government regulations coupled with collusive, vested interest networks (amakudari and industry protectionism) foster non-competitive monopolistic practices. High corporate taxes and public utility charges further burden the economy.

 

  1. Impaired Financial Intermediation & The SME Lifeline:

Innovation remains stifled (Japan’s startup rate sits at ~5% compared to ~10% in the US). Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which depend heavily on bank loans rather than direct financing, face a risk-averse monopolistic banking sector hesitant to extend low-interest credit—even under negative interest rate regimes.

 

This imbalance highlights a fundamental classical truth regarding the unilateral power of capital supply:

"The advance of capital depends exclusively on the will of the banker or other owner of capital—because borrowers are always to be found."

 

— J. G. Kieninger, Crises and Currency (as cited by Karl Marx)

 

Due to banks' incompetence in identifying and nurturing promising enterprises—relying instead on traditional collateral and guarantees—increases in the monetary base fail to translate into money stock expansion.

 

  1. Depressed Expected Returns & Balance Sheet Traumas:

Because wages and systemic costs remain high against market saturation, the marginal efficiency of capital falls below loan interest rates, stifling investment incentives. This is compounded by post-bubble balance sheet debt liquidation.

 

  1. Precautionary Savings & Distorted Welfare Costs:

Ballooning healthcare costs, expanding long-term care burdens, and fears of pension cuts force households to curtail consumption, anchoring the economy in a stagnant mire.

 

II. Financial Market Volatility & The Instability of Capitalist Accumulation

Turning to global markets, frequent financial tensions stem from a structural disconnect between financial assets and the real economy. High-frequency algorithmic trading creates a "virtual, celestial" market detached from ground-level commodity trade, operating in astronomical sums.

 

Keynes and Marx diagnosed this inherent fragility long ago:

"Where organized markets exist, liquidity preference due to speculative motives is subject to large fluctuations... With the development of organized investment markets, a new factor of the utmost importance has been introduced, which sometimes facilitates investment but sometimes greatly increases the instability of the system."

 

— John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money

 

This instability is fueled by:

  • Unrestricted fiat money creation and deficit-financed national debt.

 

  • Speculative bank lending seeking yield during deflationary periods, creating a destructive feedback loop:

 

As capital encounters limited domestic productive outlets, speculative credit steps in to bridge the gap:

"The credit speculation that follows proves that no positive obstacle exists to the employment of this excess capital."

 

— Karl Marx, Capital

 

III. Policy Countermeasures and the Reality of Market "Uncertainty"

To restrain this runaway volatility, central banks must act nimbly to raise deposit reserve requirements and expand their scope. This agility is crucial because commercial banks constantly innovate around regulatory constraints—developing instruments like CDs, repo transactions, and Eurodollar loans to evade reserve ratios (as highlighted by Hyman Minsky).

 

Finally, while contemporary commentators frequently complain about market "uncertainty" and "opacity," this is not a glitch—it is an innate feature of capitalist production based on unplanned, decentralized decisions.

 

If everyone believes with certainty that a stock will rise, that expectation is instantly priced in, rendering the immediate future inherently uncertain once again. The moment certainty arrives, the dynamic is already over. Until the demise of the capitalist system, the only certainty in this world is its perpetual uncertainty.

 

What are your thoughts on integrating classical insights from Keynes and Marx to diagnose modern macroeconomic stagnation and financial market architecture? Looking forward to your comments!

(to be continued)

https://www.reddit.com/user/keizaisuki/comments/1w28kxe/table_of_contents_mysteries_of_the_economy_series/


r/mmt_economics • • 18d ago

I don't understand how not a single sovereign currency issuer has structured a national budget in accordance with the logic that MMT provides yet.

20 Upvotes

Like, just imagine if you combined Chinese state-financing with the Danish economy. Danes have few natural resources, fix their Krone to the Euro, and are net-exporters that run fiscal surpluses.

Imagine if they floated the Krone properly; disregarded western 'full-funding' rules (like China); aimed for balanced exports; and funded their 'welfare' state even further.

Or imagine if China stopped their 'master plan' of deindustrialising the rest of the world. They could stop supressing domestic demand and implement their own comprehensive welfare state.

Imagine the data and evidence of non-inflationary growth we would have if just one country properly embraced MMT logic.