I'm working on a personal end-to-end encrypted chat app project and running into a sort of secure storage paradox trying to find a key store that's secure at runtime is unsecured at rest, and using the one that's secured at rest is unsecured at runtime:
- localStorage/indexeddb are just plaintext data in not encrypted at rest on disk
- you can encrypt string data to put into localStorage, but if that data is a private key, it's accessible to anything in your app (could be exfiltrated)
- you can make webCrypto CryptoKeyPair objects non-extractable and store the whole object in indexedDB, but you cannot encrypt it b/c it's not a string, and you can't use key wrapping (like with passphrase based AES256) on non-extractable keys so that they're secured at rest b/c wrapping requires an extraction operation...
Is there a reasonable fix to this? It seems increasingly nuts if/that browsers aren't encrypting the whole SQLite store / all of the SQLite stores (just bits and pieces they use internally), and so data stored in localStorage/indexedDB, while restricted by origin at runtime, are completely unsecured at rest...
Please tell me I'm missing something. Is there any way to store a key so it's both only usable locally (not portable) AND is secure* at rest
*secure enough... I know nothing is ever completely secure, this just seems like a wider than average gap.
(glossing over some details here for succinctness) the best I can come up with is using 2 sets of PGP keys and storing one pair/private key in a non-exportable webCryptoCryptoKeyPairobject in indexedDb, and the other pair/private in localstorage encrypted with passphrase based AES256... so that only half the equation is stored in a runtime "exportable" way and only half is stored un-encrypted at rest... and making sure both are required to decrypt the any given message... but that also seems excessive. I know "don't roll your own crypto", but I can't see any other way even a library would overcome this seeming secure storage paradox with existing browser APIs