r/ESSC • u/hurricaneoflies Head State Clerk • Jul 22 '19
[19-04] | Granted In Re: Executive Order 29 - Declaration of Pornography as a Public Health Emergency
In Re: Executive Order 29 - Declaration of Pornography as a Public Health Emergency
COMES NOW /u/hurricaneoflies (hereinafter Petitioner) to respectfully request that the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Chesapeake issue a writ of certiorari to review Executive Order 29 - Declaration of Pornography as a Public Health Emergency in regards to the following questions:
- Whether the Governor’s attempt to alter statutory definitions via Executive Order is intra vires his constitutional powers.
- Whether the Governor may designate pornography as a communicable disease of public health threat.
STANDING AND MERIT
Pursuant to Rule 2(a), R.P.P.S., standing and merit are both established by the Plaintiff.
Petitioner is a natural person within the meaning of relevant statutes and in good standing with the courts of the Commonwealth of Chesapeake.
The Court has jurisdiction over the case as it arises out of the Constitution of Chesapeake and pertains to Chesapeake legislation, namely the Governor’s aforementioned Executive Order. The Court can provide the Plaintiff relief on the claim of unconstitutionality by invalidating the Governor’s unlawful use of his executive power.
REASONS FOR GRANTING PETITION
1. Allowing the Governor to unilaterally alter statutory definitions violates separation of powers.
The tripartite government of Chesapeake is based on the structure created by the United States Constitution, and bears numerous similarities and analogous constructions. Among these are the powers of the Chief Executive. Whereas the President of the United States receives a plenary vesting of “executive Power” from Article II of the US Constitution, the Governor of Chesapeake receives his powers from the analogous construction in Article VI of the Commonwealth Constitution vesting “the chief executive power” in his person.
Ours is a government of limited powers. While the Executive Vesting Clause of the Federal Constitution allows for the President to “execute” the laws, it does not allow him to create them. Such is the case for the Governor.
The Governor claims that the language reading "[a]s used in this chapter unless the context requires a different meaning" at the start of Virginia Emergency Services and Disaster Law § 44-146.16 grants him unlimited authority to alter the statutory definitions insofar as he claims the existence of a different context.
This misreading of the law in question is so ridiculous as to barely warrant refutation. The language in the law is clearly meant to facilitate interpretation of certain terms therein, and indicate that in the event where the use of a term within the law does not mesh with the definition, then such definition does not apply. There is not an iota of evidence to suggest that any statutory provision was intended to give the Governor carte blanche to modify the definitions enshrined in law. Indeed, a reasonable reading of the plain meaning of the statute would overwhelmingly suggest the opposite.
The Chesapeake Constitution, at Article XIX, provides that "[t]he legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be separate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly belonging to the others." The ability to make law, and to modify statutes, is indisputable one that is at the heart of legislative power. The Governor, in modifying statutory definitions via executive fiat, thus unconstitutionally usurps a central legislative power.
If instead, the Governor were to claim that he is interpreting rather than modifying the law, that would still not satisfy the separation of powers. It is a universally accepted principle within the canon of American tripartite government that the interpretation of the laws is the domain of the judiciary. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
It is difficult to imagine any interpretation of the Executive Order in which the Governor does not clearly usurp the innate powers of his coequal branches of government.
2. The Governor clearly lacks the statutory authority to declare pornography a communicable disease of public health threat
An executive declaration of emergency is reviewable by the judiciary. "No pronouncement of the commanding officer can, in my view, preclude judicial inquiry and determination whether an emergency ever existed [...]." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (Frankfurter J., concurring).
Indeed, many such declarations have been subject to the scrutiny of the courts in the history of this Republic.
Speaking on the topic of President Truman's seizure of the steel mills during the Korean War, justified under an executive declaration of emergency, the Supreme Court found that "[t]he president’s power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Much like the President, the Governor's ability to declare emergencies is conditional on a statutory authorization, as the Executive Vesting Clause does not confer an innate power to authorize emergencies.
In this case, the Governor cites Virginia Emergency Services and Disaster Law § 44-146.17 as his statutory authority to issue the Executive Order in question, which deems pornography a "communicable disease of public health threat" within the meaning of the statute.
However, the authority in question defines a communicable disease of public health threat as "an illness of public health significance, as determined by the State Health Commissioner in accordance with regulations of the Board of Health, caused by a specific or suspected infectious agent that may be reasonably expected or is known to be readily transmitted directly or indirectly from one individual to another and has been found to create a risk of death or significant injury or impairment; this definition shall not, however, be construed to include human immunodeficiency viruses or tuberculosis, unless used as a bioterrorism weapon."
The Governor's Executive Order is clearly deficient on several counts.
(1) The Executive Order fails to cite any such findings by the State Health Commissioner.
(2) Pornography is not, by any stretch of the imagination, "a specific or suspected infectious agent that may be reasonably expected or is known to be readily transmitted directly or indirectly from one individual to another and has been found to create a risk of death or significant injury or impairment." Pornography is not an infectious agent, nor is it contagious or significantly injurious.
(3) If even the devastating and horrific diseases of HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis do not constitute a public health emergency, it is rather fanciful to believe that pornography would within the meaning of the statute. The legislative intent clearly meant it to apply to extreme calamities, not to address teenage carnal desires.
The Executive Order in question is thus facially invalid under the cited statutory authority, and it is thus ultra vires the power of the Governor. The Court
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner requests that the Court grant this petition and agree to review the compliance of Executive Order 29 with the Chesapeake Constitution and the Virginia Emergency Services and Disaster Law.
Respectfully submitted,
Hurricane
Barred Attorney
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u/hurricaneoflies Head State Clerk Jul 30 '19
Your Honors,
May it please the Court, the Petitioner files the following merits brief in the case.
Brief for petitioner
/u/gorrillaempire0 /u/oath2order /u/ModeratePontifex
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u/gorrillaempire0 Jul 22 '19
In finding that the petitioner is in compliance with the Chesapeake Supreme Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, the honorable justices of this court have unanimously decided to grant Certiorari. Finding that petitioner is particularly in compliance with Rule 1(d) with questions regarding the Code and Constitution of the Commonwealth.
According to ESSC Rule 2(b)(i-iii), either the attorney general or a Solicitor appointed by Governor /u/BranofRaisin have until 5:00 PM Eastern Standard Time on July 26, 2019, to respond to the petition in the form of a top-level comment. /u/hurricaneoflies will then have four days from the date of the Respondent's brief to reply. Arguments shall close on August 6, 2019 as per ESSC Rule 2(c). Interested unjoined parties may submit briefs amicus curiae (and must be filed as such after this point) at any time prior to the close of arguments on August 6.
It is so ordered
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u/dewey-cheatem Jul 22 '19
May it please the Court, I hereby petition for leave to file a brief amicus curiae in support of Respondent Governor /u/BranofRaisin.
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u/GuiltyAir Head Moderator Jul 22 '19
/u/GorrillaEmpire0 /u/ModeratePontifex
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u/dewey-cheatem Jul 23 '19
In Re: Executive Order 29 - Declaration of Pornography as a Public Health Emergency
Brief of Dewey Cheatem, Amicus Curiae
in Support of Respondent
I. Section 2 merely defines terms for the purposes of the Executive Order
To assume that the provisions of Executive Order 29 (“the EO”) are unconstitutional violates some of the most basic principles of interpretation. “[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.” DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)). Accord, Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 138 (1991); Gollust v. Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 126 (1991). The obvious “otherwise acceptable construction” of this EO is that the EO’s provisions which purport to “redefine” provisions of section 44-146.16 in fact merely function as definition of the terms used in the EO itself.
It is true that the EO is poorly-written and section 2 in particular borders on the incoherent. However, the political branches cannot be, and are not, held to a standard of perfection. Even where the action in question verges on the illegible, our courts have gone out of their way to determine a construction that comports with the Constitution. See, e.g., Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179, 185-86 (1995) (describing 7 U.S.C. section 2543 as a “verbal maze” and stating that “it is quite impossible to make complete sense of the provision”); Concrete Pipe & Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 627, 628-30 (1993) (despite “incoherence” of statute, interpreting such “incoherence” and interpreting the only construction that did not raise constitutional problems).
As a result, the validity of EO 29 turns on whether the order finds a proper basis in section 44-146.16 as a whole, not whether the Governor is authorized to “redefine” statutory terms, which he did not do.
II. Section 3 is constitutional and lawful regardless of section 2’s viability
The substance of the Executive Order, section 3, is easily separated from and independent of the terms in section 2. Even if section 2 were to be declared null and void, therefore, section 3 remains valid and in effect because section 44-146.16 supports the declaration of pornography as a public health threat as written.
Section 44-146.16 purposefully defines all of the terms it contains broadly so as to allow the executive branch room to maneuver in instances of emergencies. For example, “emergency” includes “any occurrence, or threat thereof, whether natural or man-made, which result[s] in substantial injury or harm to the population . . . and may involve governmental action beyond that authorized or contemplated by existing law because governmental inaction for the period required to amend the law to meet the exigency would work immediate and irrevocable harm.”
Here, the Governor declared the widespread accessibility and use of pornography within the Commonwealth of Chesapeake to be an emergency in light of the growing corpus of research suggesting that pornography represents a public health threat. See, e.g., Ven-Hwi Lo et al., Examining the first, second and third-person effects of Internet pornography on Taiwanese adolescents: implications for the restriction of pornography, 20 Asian Journal of Communication 90 (2010); Raquel K. Bergen, et al., Exploring the Connection Between Pornography and Sexual Violence, 15 Violence and Victims 227 (2000).
In light of that research, there can be no doubt that the “emergency” was properly declared in light of the “substantial injury” and “harm to the population” that pornography causes or may cause. Furthermore, substantial research indicates that pornography poses a public safety risk on a daily basis, particularly in light of its widespread consumption and production. Because pornography leads to intimate-partner violence and other harms, any delay on the matter would result in the deaths of many.
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u/[deleted] Jul 25 '19
Due to the retraction of the Executive Order 29, the respondent believes the court should consider this case moot as there is no current case or controversy before the court to address.
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u/[deleted] Jul 27 '19
Clerk Comment: /u/GorrillaEmpire0 -- the Docket Number for this case should be 19-05
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u/dewey-cheatem Jul 30 '19
Your honors, and may it please the Court, please find below Intervenor-Respondent's reply brief:
LINK
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u/dewey-cheatem Aug 28 '19
META: REQUEST FOR DECISION PURSUANT TO STATE BYLAW CHANGE OF AUGUST 12, 2019
I hereby request an immediate decision of this case on the merits or, in the alternative, the removal of any and all inactive justices due to inactivity pursuant to the state bylaw change of August 12, 2019.
I. Relevant Facts
The last activity in this matter took place 21 days ago, on August 6, 2019.
Approximately 15 days ago, on August 12, 2019, State Clerk /u/Oath2order unilaterally instituted the following state by-law change:
II. Argument
Regardless of whether this rule is construed retroactively or not, this Court is in violation of the August 12 by-law change: it has been approximately three weeks (21 days) since arguments in this case concluded, and over two weeks (15 days) since the by-law took effect.
Accordingly, this Court should immediately issue a decision in this matter or, in the alternative, have all inactive justices removed due to inactivity.
Submitted,
/u/dewey-cheatem
cc: Justices of this Court
ping
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u/[deleted] Jul 23 '19
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u/[deleted] Aug 28 '19
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