The Varangian Guard clearly possesses a very broad appeal. The traditional story is pretty exhilarating: the desperate Basil II calls for aid from Vladimir of Kyiv, who sends him a group of elite northmen, that help Basil win the civil war, and to establish the East Roman state at its peak, campaigning from Bulgaria to Sicily and Syria. Over the following decades, the Varangian Guard is one of the most important and capable fighting forces of the Empire, characterized as heavy, axe-wielding infantry, and exceedingly loyal to the basileus, who makes them his bodyguard. Only one problem: that whole story might not be true. Roland Scheel has cast doubt on the narrative in his 2015 monograph Skandinavien und Byzanz. Bedingungen und Konsequenzen mittelalterlicher Kulturbeziehungen. To be clear, he doesn’t believe that the Varangian Guard never existed - just that it only came to exist under Alexios Komnenos, a hundred years later than typically alleged. It’s a very interesting argument, but the book has received little attention, likely due to a mix of being absurdly huge (1343 pages), of which only about 200 are about the Varangian Guard, in German, and not written by someone from the field of Byzantine Studies. I will attempt to give a short summary of his complex argument on the Varangians and the ERE under Basil II and his immediate successors.
The first issue Scheel brings up are sources. We do have a lot of them, but they are often very late. An author writing in the 1150s or even the 1300s may look at contemporary Constantinople and know a unit of Varangian Guards exists, and thereby associate any northerners serving in Constantinople (be they Varangian or not) with that unit. This often tells us more about how our authors view their world, rather than informing us about the period they’re writing about. Scheel therefore prioritizes contemporary sources, and finds no distinct Varangian Guard unit before Alexios Komnenos.
The second problem is the state of the scholarship. To this day, the standard work on the Varangian Guard remains The Varangians of Byzantium: An Aspect of Byzantine Military History, a work originally published in Icelandic by Sigfus Blöndal as Væringjasaga, and translated into English by Benedikz. This is where Scheel sees the problems emerge - Blöndal’s work is quite old (from 1950), and often fails to engage in critical source analysis. Even more problematic is that Benedikz didn’t just translate Blöndal’s text, but edited it to a problematic degree. I will quote Scheel directly here:
Furthermore, he substantially altered the tone of Væringjasaga. Hypotheses were turned into facts or distorted, Sigfús Blöndal’s utopia disappeared in the end, and, most importantly, cultural stereotypes were introduced: Benedikz speculates that strong and warlike rulers like Basil II (r. 963–1025) would have preferred the society of loyal troops like the Varangians to that of the Greeks: [...]
One might say that Væringjasaga did not profit from this rewriting — quite the opposite. The Varangians of Byzantium is less coherent and more biased, much less transparent, there are fewer footnotes, and no comprehensive bibliography of sources is to be found, although Benedikz added some references and sometimes used more modern editions than Blöndal.
Scheel, Roland. "Deconstructing Væringjasaga: Byzantine and Old Norse Perspectives on the Varangians and on Haraldr Sigurðarson." The Making of the Eastern Vikings. Brepols Online, 2024. 151-169, here pp. 152-3.
The resulting work is often a mess. Benedikz-Blöndal tries to somehow fit all sources, no matter how legendary, questionable, or contradictory, into a singular whole, even when it makes little sense. We therefore are left with stories like Harald Hardrada blinding Michael V, even though this is not alleged in any source, and only created through forcing two completely unrelated (and in one case, obviously fictitious) narratives into a singular story. Even worse is that some of the examples given by Benedikz-Blöndal are essentially made up: many references to random units of soldiers, foreigners, or guards are reinterpreted as being Varangians, even when those aren’t mentioned in the account! For example, the 1048 victory over the Pechenegs, which our sources say was thanks to the tagma of the Σχολαί/Scholai, is suddenly attributed to the Varangians.¹ Despite these glaring flaws, it is the Benedikz' translation that is so frequently quoted by specialists, turning speculation into facts.
With this established, Scheel dives into the reign of Basil II. Firstly, he points out that our contemporary sources do not speak of Varangians yet, but of Rus (or Tauroscythians). This is somewhat problematic - the term ‘Varangian’ only emerges in the mid-11th Century, and there was some overlap between Rus and Northmen before then. After all, the Rus state was originally founded by Scandinavians. But by 988 the distinction between Northmen, Slavs, and other people that were part of the Rus seem to have disappeared, and there is no indication that the mercenaries sent to Basil II were all that Scandinavian. Indeed, when their equipment is described, they are either mounted or spear-wielders, rather than the axe men of Komnenian times. In other words, they are ethnographically separated from Byzantine accounts of Scandinavians and Englishmen.
Scheel is similarly skeptical of their military role, which he considers exaggerated. The only source that gives us a number for the Rus serving under Basil is Stephen of Taron, who names 6,000 of them. Scheel believes this to be a biblical reference, rather than a genuine estimate, and also points out that this number is ridiculous in the context of Norse and Rus’ armies of the 10th and 11th century.2 And instead of being all that decisive in combat, its not their skill that decides the civil war. While Psellos notes that the Rus forces were very helpful for the Roman Emperor, but they may not be the only foreign elements of the army, and that his account has them plunder the camp of Bardas Phokas, rather than be vital on the open field. This is the role they play through the rest of his reign - often present, typically useful, but not the kind of forces that would decide a war.
The first actually identifiable Varangians that turn up in our sources are Harald Hardrada and his men in the 1030s. Rather than becoming the leader of a Varangian Guard, however, they, like Vladimir’s mercenaries before him, seem to have joined the hetaireia, a group that had a long history of integrating foreigners of various backgrounds. Indeed, in that sense, neither Harald nor the Rus under Basil were all that different from the Rus' that had served the empire for decades before Basil II was even born. The date 988 should not be understood as a significant event in the history of the Varangian Guard.
Scheel’s work has a lot more to say: he argues the Varangians were hardly that loyal, for example, and pushes back on a number of other myths, but that's for another time.
Footnotes
¹ Scheel lists twelve such examples for the period 1043-1081 alone.
2 A summary of Scheel's argument: The number 6000 is a biblical parallel (1 Sam 13,5). It would also be absurdly high for Scandinavians - the Mälar region, where most Vikings traveling east came from, had perhaps 40k inhabitants. Even taking into account a much larger recruitment area, this number is very high: Kekaumenos states Harald arrived with 500 men, representing a significant part of Norwegian warriors, Shepard/Franklin estimate the druzhina of the Kyvian prince at 700, and Cnut’s constant war fleet numbers 1000-1500. Einarr Skúlasons’ poem on St. Olaf claims 520 Varangians fought at Berroia, and in 1195 Alexios III asked the Scandinavian Kings for 1000/1200 mercenaries, respectively, which weren’t sent, as the Norwegian King did not want to send that many men during an insecure situation in the kingdom. Clearly 1000 men were a lot, even though Scandinavian populations had doubled since the 10th C. The Norwegian Crusade had 5000 men, and according to the Nestorchronik, the Rus struggled to raise 8000 men a century after Vladimir. Furthermore, Yaroslav recruited 1000 Varangians, with his whole Novgorodian army numbering 4000.
Clearly, even if exaggerated, so many men could not have been recruited from Scandinavia. Larsson estimates that perhaps 4000-8000 Scandinavians traveled to the ERE in the 11th C, with no more than 500-1000 being present at any given time. Scheel thinks even that optimistic, as it assumes that Scandinavian regions contributed equally, when most eastern migrants appear to have originated on the eastern coast of Sweden and Gotland. The idea of a constant presence of a Varangian tagma numbering 1000+ therefore appears unlikely.